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A B S T R A C T
In this study, we examine the impact of an individual's education level on her/his mating success on the mobile
dating app Tinder. To do so, we conducted a field experiment on Tinder in which we collected data on 3,600
profile evaluations. In line with previous research on mating preferences from multiple fields, our results in-
dicate a heterogeneous effect of education level by gender: while women strongly prefer a highly educated
potential partner, this hypothesis is rejected for men. In contrast with recent influential studies from the field of
economics, we do not find any evidence that men would have an aversion to a highly educated potential partner.
Additionally, in contrast with most previous research – again from multiple fields – we do not find any evidence
for preferences for educational assortative mating, i.e. preferring a partner with a similar education level.
1. Introduction
The way we find our life partner has drastically changed over the
last few decades. Indeed, while before the Internet, i.e. around 25 years
ago, no one could find their significant other online, 22% of hetero-
sexual couples met each other this way by 2009. As a result, for het-
erosexuals the Internet has become the third most likely way of meeting
a partner, following closely behind meeting through friends (28%) or at
a bar/restaurant (23%) (Rosenfeld & Thomas, 2012).1 Additionally,
one-third of marriages initiated between 2005 and 2012 in the US
started online, and half of these started through online dating
(Cacioppo, Cacioppo, Gonzaga, Ogburn & VanderWeele, 2013). In the
future, these figures are only expected to increase, as online dating has
been losing its social stigma (Finkel, Eastwick, Karney, Reis & Sprecher,
2012), not in the least due to the recent advent of extremely popular
mobile dating apps such as Tinder (Ranzini & Lutz, 2017; Ward, 2016),
which is the app we focus on in this study.
The popularity of Tinder in the present dating landscape is apparent
from the fact that in August 2018 it became the number one app people
log into with their Facebook account, beating other apps like YouTube,
Spotify, and Candy Crush Saga (Fruhlinger, 2018). Additionally, it is
the most popular dating app for iOS and Android, with more than 100
million downloads and more than 10 million daily active users
(Sumter, Vandenbosch & Ligtenberg, 2017) in more than 190 countries
(About Tinder, 2019). Therefore not surprisingly, Tinder is currently
valued at least $3 billion (Kuchler, 2018). Further, also in terms of time
investment, Tinder is one of the most engaging apps. Indeed, according
to an interview with Tinder's executives in The New York Times in
2014, the average Tinder user logs into the app 11 times a day and
spends around 1.5 hours on the app daily (Ward, 2016). Finally, also in
terms of couple formation Tinder plays a significant role nowadays. For
example, as of this writing, Tinder users evaluate 2 billion other users
per day, which has already resulted in more than 30 billion matches in
total since its launch in 2012, in turn facilitating around 1 million
offline dates per week (About Tinder, 2019).
Although for some people Tinder has the connotation of being used
mainly to solicit casual and short relationships, multiple independent
studies have shown – through (semi-structured) interviews and surveys
of Tinder users – that this is not the case (LeFebvre, 2017; Sumter et al.,
2017; Timmermans & Courtois, 2018; Timmermans & De Caluwé,
2017). Although these studies rely on self-reported motivations and are
therefore prone to socially desirable answers, they are the best in-
dication to date of why individuals use Tinder. Sumter et al. (2017) and
Timmermans and De Caluwé (2017) have both shown that the casual
sex motive for using Tinder ranks well behind the motive for finding a
committed relationship. Further, Timmermans and Courtois (2018)
found that more than a quarter of offline Tinder encounters led to a
committed relationship. Finally, although they reported that one-third
of offline Tinder encounters led to casual sex, Timmermans and
Courtois (2018) argue that nowadays, casual sex increasingly leads to a
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committed relationship. Nonetheless, even if relationships initiated on
Tinder would ultimately be mainly casual, we believe determinants of
successfully initiating these casual relationships would still be of high
interest, given the indisputable popularity of Tinder and the time in-
vestment in this app (supra).
Despite its popularity, as of today, no study has examined mating
behaviour2 on mobile dating apps such as Tinder. This allows us to
make several unique contributions to two bodies of literature. First, we
contribute to the literature on mating success by examining for the first
time the impact of an individual's education level on her/his mating
success3 on the mobile dating app Tinder. We link our findings to the
important discussion of income inequality that may be facilitated by
individuals’ partner choice (infra, Section 2.2). Second, we add to the
literature examining the (non-monetary) returns to education, in casu
dating market returns. By doing so, we also contribute to the recently
growing literature reporting negative dating market returns for women
due to men's aversion to highly educated women (infra, Section 2.1).
This aversion may have substantial consequences for women's progress
in the labour market.
Additionally, in contrast to most other studies examining the impact
of education level on mating success in an offline setting and on classic
online dating websites,4 we do this by means of a correspondence ex-
periment, which allows us to estimate causal effects. Apart from this
methodological contribution, our study offers several theoretical con-
tributions. First, our unique experimental design allows us to examine
actual, revealed mate preferences instead of stated mate preferences,
which have been shown to be substantially different (infra, Section 2.3).
Second, we examine mate preferences ex ante to interactions instead of
ex post, avoiding bias due to cues of attraction during these interactions.
Third, we are able to estimate the impact of education level on mating
success without substantial search frictions or social frictions. While
search frictions influence partner choice as a consequence of increased
contact opportunities between individuals who are similar on various
characteristics (such as education level), social frictions affect mating
behaviour through the psychological cost of being rejected.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In the next
section we summarise the literature on both the returns to education
and mating behaviour. In Section 3, we elaborate on the features of our
correspondence experiment and in Section 4 we present and discuss the
results of our analyses. Section 5 concludes, indicates several limita-
tions of this study, and formulates various directions for future re-
search.
2. Literature review
2.1. Returns to education
As noted above, this study adds to two main bodies of literature.
First, it adds to the literature examining the returns to education. On
the one hand, most previous studies on this topic examined the impact
of education on monetary outcomes such as earnings, finding a positive
effect (Card & Krueger, 1992; Jensen, 2010; Leigh & Ryan, 2008;
Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2004). On the other hand, several other
studies examined the impact of education on non-monetary returns,
such as, among many others,5 health (Groot & van den Brink, 2007;
Silles, 2009), happiness (Chen, 2012; Cuñado & de Gracia, 2012), and
criminal behaviour (Buonanno & Leonida, 2009; Groot & van den Brink,
2010; Machin, Marie & Vujić, 2011), all of which improved with higher
education level. The present study adds to this second branch of studies
in the returns to education literature by examining the returns to
education on the dating market.
In recent years, an increasing number of studies (infra) reported
negative returns to education on the dating market for women. This
finding is often explained by the cost that is accompanied by deviating
from social norms (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000), in casu gender identity
norms. Even today, gender identity norms prescribe that men should be
the main breadwinner in a relationship (Bertrand, Kamenica & Pan,
2015; Fortin, 2005). Therefore, given the positive correlation between
education and earnings (supra), highly educated – and therefore high-
earning – women have a disadvantage on the dating market, as it makes
them less desirable to (some) men.
Bertrand et al. (2015) and Hwang (2016) indeed found that mar-
riages where the wife earns more than the husband are substantially
less common compared to the reversed situation. The former authors
also found that when these marriages do occur, they are less happy and
more likely to end in divorce. Additionally, Pierce, Dahl and
Nielsen (2013) even found that men who are outearned by their part-
ners suffer more sexual health problems. Using data from classic online
dating websites and speed-dating, Hitsch, Hortaçsu and Ariely (2010a)
and Fisman, Iyengar, Kamenica and Simonson (2006) also found that
men are intimidated by highly educated and highly ambitious women,
respectively. Finally, Bursztyn, Fujiwara and Pallais (2017) have shown
that this aversion of men to highly educated women causes women to
shy away from actions that could improve their careers in order to
avoid signalling undesirable traits on the marriage market, such as high
ambition. As a result, (women's anticipation to) men's aversion to
highly educated, high-earning, and/or highly ambitious women may
have a detrimental impact on women's progress on the labour market.
2.2. Mating behaviour
Second, this study contributes to the literature examining mating
behaviour, which in the past focused on partner choice in an offline
setting and on classic online dating websites. In an offline setting,
multiple studies from the field of psychology have shown that men
(compared to women) state a higher preference for physical attrac-
tiveness while women (compared to men) state a higher preference for
highly educated partners and partners with a high earnings potential
(Buss, 1989; Buss & Barnes, 1986; Buss et al., 1990; Shackelford,
Schmitt & Buss, 2005; Wiederman & Allgeier, 1992). Similarly, using
data from speed-dating events, Fisman et al. (2006) found that men
(compared to women) put greater weight on physical attractiveness
while women (compared to men) put greater weight on intelligence and
ambition.
Additionally, studies using data from classic online dating websites
also found similar mate preferences. For example, Whyte, Chan and
Torgler (2018) found that women were almost twice as likely than men
to state a preference for a certain education level and that women also
stated a higher minimum acceptable education level in a preferred
partner. Similarly, Hitsch et al. (2010a) and Hitsch, Hortaçsu and
Ariely (2010b) found that men value physical attractiveness more than
women and that women value education and earnings potential more
than men. Finally, using data from a field experiment on a classic,
Chinese online dating website, Ong (2016) found that men did not have
a higher preference for highly educated women while women did have
a higher preference for highly educated men.
All these findings are in line with evolutionary psychology, which
suggests that mate preferences are driven by a potential partner's re-
productive capacity (Trivers, 1972). More specifically, on the one hand
a woman's reproductive value is signalled by greater physical attrac-
tiveness, indicating higher fertility. On the other hand, a man's
2 In this study, we define ‘mating behaviour’ as the behaviour of individuals in
any stage of the dating process, ranging from the first contact to the initiation of
a casual or committed relationship.
3 Similar to the definition of ‘mating behaviour’ (supra, footnote 2), in this
study we define ‘mating success’ as the success of individuals in any stage of the
dating process, ranging from the first contact to the initiation of a casual or
committed relationship.
4 Such websites include Match.com, PlentyOfFish, and OkCupid.
5 See Vila (2000) and Hout (2012) for more extensive reviews of the literature
on the non-monetary returns to education.
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reproductive capacity can be evaluated by his potential to provide (fi-
nancially) for future offspring, which is signalled by (among others) his
education level.
Many studies examining mating behaviour do not only examine so-
called common preferences, i.e. preferences that are valued by everyone
irrespective of one's own attributes, they also examine assortative pre-
ferences, i.e. preferences for attributes similar to one's own attributes
(Buss, 1985). Multiple studies found evidence for these assortative
preferences. For example, previous research on assortative mating in
the field of psychology has identified this sorting behaviour on a large
number of characteristics, ranging from age, religion, and political or-
ientation (Watson et al., 2004) to body mass index
(Silventoinen, Kaprio, Lahelma, Viken & Rose, 2003) and even non-
obvious physical traits such as nose breadth and earlobe length
(Spuhler, 1968).6
Additionally, earlier research has examined the presence of educa-
tional assortative mating using data from offline dating, i.e. data on
marriages and from speed-dating events, as well as using data from
classic online dating websites. In an offline setting, many studies – from
different fields including psychology, sociology, and economics – have
shown that marriages in which the partners have a comparable edu-
cation level occur significantly more often than would be predicted by
chance alone (Blossfeld, 2009; Domingue, Fletcher, Conley &
Boardman, 2014; Mare, 1991; Pencavel, 1998; Rockwell, 1976; Watson
et al., 2004). Using data from speed-dating events, Belot and
Francesconi (2013) found evidence for assortative mating preferences
based on education level. Similarly, using data from classic online
dating websites, the preference for a partner with a comparable edu-
cation level has again been shown by multiple authors (Hitsch et al.,
2010a, 2010b; Ong, 2016; Skopek, Schulz & Blossfeld, 2010; Whyte &
Torgler, 2017a).
These preferences for assortative mating based on education level
may have important economic consequences. Indeed, since in a re-
lationship resources are shared, income inequality in a society increases
when high-earning (low-earning) men mate with high-earning (low-
earning) women. Given the strong link between education level and
earnings potential (supra, SubSection 2.1), educational assortative
mating preferences should thus increase income inequality. Indeed,
multiple independent studies – from both sociology and economics –
have shown that increased educational assortative mating increases
income inequality in society (Blossfeld & Buchholz, 2009; Greenwood,
Guner, Kocharkov & Santos, 2014; Hu & Qian, 2015; Mare, 1991).
2.3. Limitations of previous research
Most of the abovementioned studies suffer from various limitations
preventing their results to be interpreted as causal effects. First, many
studies – especially those in the field of psychology – examined data on
stated mate preferences (Buss, 1989; Buss & Barnes, 1986; Buss et al.,
1990; Shackelford et al., 2005; Whyte et al., 2018; Wiederman &
Allgeier, 1992). However, the main issue with statedmate preferences is
that they do not necessarily coincide with actual mate preferences, as it
is not (always) the case that individuals pick a partner who satisfies
their a priori stated preferences for a potential partner (Eastwick &
Finkel, 2008; Hitsch et al., 2010b; Todd, Penke, Fasolo & Lenton, 2007;
Whyte & Torgler, 2017b). The discrepancy between stated and actual
mate preferences may especially be present for preferences for educa-
tion level, as it may reveal unromantic and possibly mercenary motives
as has been suggested by Ong and Wang (2015), who examined mate
preferences for income.
Next, although multiple studies mentioned in the previous subsec-
tion did examine actual mate preferences, it is still not possible to give a
causal interpretation to their results, as they examined dating outcomes
ex post to interactions. This is the case for studies using marriage data
(Bertrand et al., 2015; Hwang, 2016) and studies using speed-dating
data (Belot & Francesconi, 2013; Fisman et al., 2006). Ong and
Wang (2015) have argued that using such data to examine dating
outcomes may lead to biased results due to cues of attraction during
interaction. Additionally, it may be the case that individuals connected
on factors that were correlated with education, such as beauty
(Katz, 1995), intelligence, or income (supra, SubSection 2.1). In studies
using speed-dating data, this concern is reinforced by the fact that it is
uncertain whether individuals explicitly talked about their education in
their three- or four-minute dates.
Additionally, although Hitsch et al. (2010a), Hitsch et al. (2010a),
2010b), Skopek et al. (2010), and Whyte and Torgler (2017a) used data
from classic online dating websites to examine dating outcomes ex ante
to interactions, they did not randomly assign different education levels
to various profiles. As a result, these studies were unable to rule out that
their results were driven by (unobservable) factors correlated with
education and were therefore unable to estimate causal relationships.
This concern is especially present for studies in which there is no
control for beauty and income, such as in the studies by
Skopek et al. (2010) and Whyte and Torgler (2017a), although these
factors have been shown to have a strong correlation with education
(supra). Furthermore, given that on several classic online dating web-
sites – such as OKCupid – users are able to create their own idiosyn-
cratic screening mechanisms, these websites could select for rather
unconventional daters, causing results to be potentially biased due to
this selection effect.
To the extent of our knowledge, only one study to date has ex-
amined the impact of education level on actual, revealed mate pre-
ferences ex ante to interactions and with random assignment of edu-
cation level. Ong (2016) found that men's visits to women's profiles
were unaffected by the profiles’ education level, while women's visits to
men's profiles were increasing with the profiles’ education level. We
build on this study by examining the impact of education level on mate
preferences by means of a randomised field experiment on Tinder. Our
study significantly differs from the study by Ong (2016) in three ways.
First, we used a more precise measure of mating success: while
Ong (2016) used the number of profile visits as an indicator of mating
success, we used an explicit indication of interest by potential partners
(infra, Section 3.5). Second, we set up our field experiment on a mobile
dating app instead of on a classic online dating website. Third, we ex-
amined Western singles instead of Chinese singles.
As noted earlier, many studies examining mating behaviour also
examine preferences for assortative mating. However, next to the
abovementioned methodological challenges when examining mate
preferences, examining assortative mate preferences is accompanied by
two additional challenges. First, results on assortative mating patterns
using marriage data and data from classic online dating websites could
be biased due to search frictions. When using marriage data, these
search frictions are due to people with a certain education level
matching with people with a comparable education level just because
they spend a lot of time with these people at school, in college, or at
work, rather than because of an actual preference for a partner with this
education level (Hitsch et al., 2010a; Mare, 1991; Skopek et al., 2010).
Blossfeld (2009); Mare (1991), and Shafer and Qian (2010) indeed
argue that educational assortative mating in an offline setting is due to
increased contact opportunities between men and women with similar
education levels. When using data from classic online dating websites,
search frictions are caused by the ability of users to filter potential
partners based on their education level.
Second, mating behaviour in an offline setting and on classic online
dating websites is influenced by the psychological cost of being re-
jected, also denoted as ‘social frictions’. Indeed, due to fear of rejection,
individuals might not approach potential partners who they perceive to
be unattainable (Hitsch et al., 2010a). Consequently, they will only
6 See Buss (1985) for a more extensive review of the literature on assortative
mating patterns.
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contact potential partners who they perceive to be equally (or less)
desirable as them, a perception that may be determined by (among
others) one's education level.
To the extent of our knowledge, again only the study by Ong (2016)
was able to examine actual, revealed preferences for educational as-
sortative mating ex ante to interaction and with random assignment of
education level, in a context without substantial search frictions and
social frictions. Ong (2016) found that on a classic, Chinese online
dating website, women do not mate assortatively based on education
level per se – i.e. because it may increase relationship public goods such
as enlightened conversation. However, he did find that women mate
assortatively based on education level for the sake of maximising (fu-
ture) mate income, which is strongly correlated with education (supra,
Section 2.1).
Similarly to Ong (2016), we were able to examine assortative mate
preferences in the absence of search frictions and social frictions. In-
deed, contrary to offline dating, contact opportunities do not differ on
Tinder between people with equal education levels and people with
unequal education levels, eliminating bias due to search frictions. Si-
milarly, contrary to classic online dating websites, Tinder users cannot
filter based on education level (infra, Section 3.2). Therefore, the pool
of potential partners encountered on this app is both bigger and more
diversified in terms of (among others) education level compared to
classic online dating websites. As people's actual preferences may differ
from their stated preferences (supra), Tinder users may find themselves
attracted to people who they would not have encountered on classic
online dating websites, because these people would already have been
filtered out based on their (too low) education level. Additionally, on
Tinder bias due to social frictions is eliminated as the fear of rejection is
less (or even not at all) present because users anonymously show in-
terest in a potential partner. This anonymity is only lifted when both
users show interest in each other (infra, Section 3.2) and therefore re-
duces (or even removes altogether) the psychological cost of explicit
rejections. Furthermore, the (time) cost of expressing interest in a po-
tential partner on Tinder is low (infra, Section 3.2), in turn also redu-
cing the psychological pain of being rejected.
3. Method
3.1. Correspondence experiment framework
Correspondence experiments have been used in labour economics to
identify causal unequal treatment on the labour market. The causes for
unequal treatment that have been identified in previous literature
spanned from racial discrimination (Baert, Cockx, Gheyle &
Vandamme, 2015; Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004) to discrimination
based on a candidate's previous experience in the labour market (Kroft,
Lange & Notowidigdo, 2013; Eriksson & Rooth; 2014).7 We extend this
correspondence experiment framework to the mobile dating app
Tinder.
3.2. How Tinder works
In contrast to classic online dating websites, on Tinder users need to
fill in only three criteria to get started. More specifically, they fill in (i)
their sexual preference, (ii) the minimum and maximum age of poten-
tial partners (the ‘age range’), and (iii) the maximum distance a po-
tential partner can be removed from them (the ‘distance range’). Then,
users get shown, one by one, all profiles of other users that fit their
three criteria. The information provided on the main screen of these
profiles is the other users’ (i) picture(s), (ii) first name, (iii) age, (iv)
education, and (v) occupation, although the latter two pieces of
information are optional entries. See Fig. A–1 in the Appendix for a
fictitious example of a Tinder profile. Additionally, users have the
possibility to click on a profile, after which they get shown the other
user's distance in kilometres and (if provided by the other user) their
bio (a short free text), Instagram photos, and favourite songs on Spotify.
Based on this information, users anonymously decide (i.e. without
the other user knowing their decision) whether they dislike (swipe left)
or like (swipe right) the other user. Additionally, users can superlike
(swipe up) a profile.8 With a superlike, the other person gets a notifi-
cation that someone superliked her/him, which is not the case with
regular likes. After making a decision on a certain profile, the user
immediately gets shown the next profile. In the case that two users
(super)like each other, they ‘match’ and have the possibility to start a
conversation, potentially to arrange an offline date. This is not the case
if one person indicates they dislike the other person.
3.3. Fictitious Tinder profiles
For this study, we created 24 fictitious Tinder profiles in multiple
cities in Flanders, the northern, Dutch-speaking region of Belgium. We
only let these profiles differ on our characteristic of interest, i.e. edu-
cation level, which was randomly assigned to the 24 fictitious profiles.
Education level was signalled by filling in the line ‘education’ on the
main screen.9 See Fig. A–1 for an example, in which the profile has the
education level ‘Master in Economics’. The people in our fictitious
profiles all obtained a degree related to the field of study ‘business and
economics’. Although this limits our external validity (infra, Section 5,
third paragraph, on the limitations of this study), it ensures internal
validity. The four degrees of education level that were used, i.e. the four
treatments, were the following, ranked from highest to lowest:
• Master (5 years) in Business Engineering (hereafter: ‘Ma+’)• Master (4 years) in Public Administration and Management (here-
after: ‘Ma–’)• Bachelor (3 years) in Business Management (hereafter: ‘Ba+’)• Bachelor (3 years) in Office Management (hereafter: ‘Ba–’).10,11
In Flanders, Master's degrees are obtained at universities while these
Bachelor's degrees are obtained at colleges, which are less prestigious
than universities.
The ranking of these education levels was based on the average
starting wage for graduates from each of these studies when leaving
school. Graduates with a Master in Business Engineering earn the most,
graduates with a Master in Public Administration and Management
earn the second most, and so on. Given the popularity of the education
levels used in our fictitious profiles (see footnote 11), it is likely that
this ranking of starting salaries is known to the subjects (infra,
Section 3.4) of our study. As a consequence, the effect of education level
identified in our study may (partly) be due to the signal of a higher
earnings potential that often coincides with a higher education level
(supra, Section 2.1). We therefore interpret our results as the total effect
of education level, i.e. encompassing also higher earnings potential,
instead of as the direct effect of education level – as examined by
Ong (2016) – which for example could be due to a preference for an
7 See Baert (2018) for an extensive review of correspondence experiments in
the labour market since 2005.
8 This is possible once (five times) a day for non-paying (paying) users.
9 On Tinder, about two-thirds of users show their education level (see also
Subsection 3.4).
10 Revealing one's education level on this level is not uncommon on Tinder, as
356 of the 2,345 Tinder users in our sample who revealed their education level
(infra, Subsection 4.3), revealed it on this level.
11 Table A–1 in the Appendix shows that the four degrees of education levels
which we used for the fictitious profiles are fairly (for Ma–) to very (for all other
education levels) popular in Flanders. Therefore, no education level was un-
common or distinctive to hold. This is true both in general as well as when
considering each gender separately.
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enlightened conversation or a desire to go on sophisticated dates.
It must be noted that the four education levels are all degrees from
higher education. We refrained from using non-higher education de-
grees for our profiles, as then it may have been unclear for the subjects
of our study that that degree was the highest education level our pro-
files attained. For example, a Tinder profile that reports as degree
‘secondary education in the general track’, may be thought to have had
higher education without mentioning this in their profile.
Consequently, our results can be considered as a lower bound for the
true effect of education level on mating success. More specifically, the
results are expected to be more pronounced when comparing profiles
with a tertiary education degree with profiles with a secondary edu-
cation degree.
Our profiles were all aged 23, to ensure that the profiles signal that
they acquired the degree mentioned in their profiles. As students in
Flanders start higher education at the age of 18, and the longest period
of study for our profiles was the ‘Master in Business Engineering’, which
spans five years, our profiles would all be perceived as recently grad-
uated. As a consequence of using age 23 for our profiles, our profiles
were only shown to subjects who included age 23 in their age range.
We could not deploy four profiles with four different education le-
vels in the same city using the same picture, as subjects could then
encounter the same picture multiple times with different education
levels, potentially making them aware of the experiment. Therefore, we
used four different ‘looks’, i.e. four different pictures, for our profiles to
which we attached the four education levels. To ensure that the pictures
we used for the profiles were similar in terms of attractiveness, we
scored 32 different pictures (16 male, 16 female) on Amazon
Mechanical Turk (hereafter: ‘MTurk’),12 and selected eight pictures
(four male, four female) that 493 workers on MTurk judged to be si-
milar in level of attractiveness. Then, to ensure that the effect of edu-
cation level was not driven by the picture, we attached to each picture
three different education levels in three different cities.13 Table A–2 in
the Appendix shows a schematic overview of our 24 fictitious profiles.
For the names of our profiles, we chose eight (four male, four fe-
male) of the most common Dutch names for 23-year-olds, as this was
the age of the people in our profiles (supra). More specifically, these
names were Jens, Simon, Michiel, and Niels for the male profiles
(De populairste Vlaamse jongensnamen van 1995, n.d.), and Lisa, Eline,
Jana, and Melissa for the female profiles (De populairste Vlaamse
meisjesnamen van 1995, n.d.). There was no randomisation of the
names over the different pictures: each name was mapped one-to-one
with the pictures. This could not influence our results, as we rando-
mised our treatment of interest, i.e. education level, over the (fixed)
combination of the names and the pictures.
Finally, we did not fill in an occupation and short bio for our Tinder
profiles. Additionally, we did not link our profiles to an Instagram or
Spotify account. All of this is not unusual on Tinder, as we show in the
next subsection.
3.4. Subjects
Our subjects were other, real, Tinder users who fit our three criteria,
i.e. (i) sexual preference, (ii) age range, and (iii) distance range. First, in
this study we only looked at heterosexual preferences. Therefore, we
indicated that we only wanted to see male (female) subjects with our
female (male) profiles. Second, for the age range, we chose ages 23 to
27, in order to exclude students from our sample. Third, our distance
range we gradually increased per kilometre from the minimum of two
kilometres on, in order to find the subjects who were closest to us. We
did this to ensure that our profiles were in the distance range of our
subjects, so that our profiles would show up in the stack of profiles that
our subjects evaluated. Only once we had to increase the range above
the minimum of two kilometres and all subjects were found in a range
of three kilometres.
With each of our 24 fictitious profiles, between January 2018 and
March 2018 we randomly liked 150 of the first Tinder users who were
presented to our fictitious profiles, resulting in a sample size of 3600
observations. We did not simply like the very first 150 Tinder users
presented to us, as Tinder may then have perceived our fictitious pro-
files as robots. Therefore, for each Tinder user presented to us, we
randomly generated a number between 0 and 1 and liked the Tinder
user if the number was above 0.5. For each of our 24 fictitious profiles,
all subjects were recruited from the first 325 Tinder users presented to
our fictitious profiles.
As a result of randomly liking 150 subjects with each of our ficti-
tious profiles, some subjects were liked by more than one of our ficti-
tious profiles. More specifically, 39 subjects were liked by all four fic-
titious profiles in the same city, 210 subjects were liked by three
profiles in the same city, 604 subjects were liked by two profiles in the
same city, and 1606 subjects were liked by one profile. No subjects
were liked by profiles in different cities. Therefore, the total number of
unique subjects in our sample is 2459. We take this into account in our
analyses in Section 4.
Table 1 presents summary statistics on all available information on
our subjects.14 In column (1) the summary statistics are reported for the
full sample of subjects. Subjects had on average 4.432 pictures in their
Tinder profile and were on average 24.141 years old. A total of 65.1%
(26.3%) of individuals revealed their education (occupation). This
education level (occupation level) was high in 57.7% (26.3%) of the
(revealed) cases.15 Finally, 57.1% of subjects filled in a short bio and
14.1% (11.3%) of subjects linked their Tinder profile to their Instagram
account (Spotify account). Columns (2) to (5) present the summary
statistics of the subjects by treatment status, i.e. by the four different
education levels of our fictitious profiles. To test whether subjects dif-
fered by treatment status, we used the treatment status as a categorical
independent variable in (logistic) regressions with the variables in
Table 1 as dependent variables. We report the p-values of the coeffi-
cients measuring the differences between subjects with different treat-
ment status in Table A–3. We find one significant difference at the 5%
confidence level. However, when making 54 comparisons, rejecting one
true null hypothesis is to be expected (Type I error). Therefore, we
conclude that for all variables reported in Table 1, subjects did not
significantly differ from each other by treatment status and that our
randomisation process was thus successful.
3.5. Responses
Because with each fictitious profile we liked just the 150 subjects
(and no other), if a subject liked or superliked our profile, we would be
made aware of this by Tinder, which would indicate that we had a
12 MTurk is an Internet marketplace on which individuals can hire ‘workers’
to perform small online tasks in return for financial compensation. Multiple
independent studies have shown that data gathered on MTurk is of high quality
(Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 2013;
Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010; Rand, 2012).
13 It was our intention to attach to each picture all four education levels over
four cities. However, as Facebook realised we were creating fake Facebook
profiles (which is a necessary prerequisite to create a Tinder profile), it started
blocking our accounts and we were unable to perform our experiment in the
fourth city. However, we are confident that we have enough randomisation left
in the three cities to estimate causal effects.
14 Although we also have information on the names of the subjects, quanti-
fying this was not informative. Additionally, we do not report information on
the subjects’ distance from our fictitious profiles, as this changed when the
subjects were physically moving.
15 Education level was considered high when subjects had a university degree.
Occupation level was considered high when subjects had occupations that re-
quired a university degree.
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match with that subject.16 Therefore, we were able to distinguish be-
tween four different possible outcomes: the subject (i) disliked, (ii)
liked, or (iii) superliked our profile. Additionally, if there was a match
(because the subject (super)liked our profile), we also recorded (iv)
whether the subject started a conversation with our profile. Two weeks
after liking 150 subjects with a certain fictitious profile, we stopped
registering responses by the subjects.
Table 2 gives an overview of the frequencies of the different out-
comes. When considering all subjects, about one-third (33.2%) of our
profiles (hereafter: ‘the evaluated profiles’) received a (super)like.
However, this conceals remarkable differences between the male sub-
jects and female subjects. Indeed, male subjects (super)liked 61.9% of
the female evaluated profiles, while female subjects (super)liked only
4.5% of the male evaluated profiles. These findings are in line with
previous research on online dating in general (Fiore, Taylor, Zhong,
Mendelsohn & Cheshire, 2010; Todd et al., 2007) and on Tinder in
particular (Tyson, Perta, Haddadi & Seto, 2016). Indeed,
Tyson et al. (2016), p. 1) argue that this is due to a feedback loop: ‘men
are driven to be less selective in the hope of attaining a match, whilst
women are increasingly driven to be more selective, safe in the
knowledge that any profiles they like will probably result in a match’.
Additionally, these findings are in line with previous research in evo-
lutionary psychology and more specifically with parental investment
theory (Trivers, 1972). This theory argues that women have a greater
parental investment and are therefore looking for the most high-quality
partner possible, in order to obtain high-quality offspring, therefore
being more selective. Conversely, men have a smaller parental invest-
ment and are looking to maximise the quantity of offspring, resulting in
them being less selective. Finally, the fact that the subjects were the
same age or older than our profiles, may also have caused female
subjects to (super)like our profiles less often than male subjects, given
that in heterosexual relationships the male partner is often older (Buss,
1989; Hitsch et al., 2010b). However, the fact that all subjects indicated
in their search criteria that they were interested in profiles aged 23
(supra, Section 3.3), reduces the likelihood that age preferences are the
driver of this selectivity.
Very few subjects used the superlike option, i.e. only 1.4% of all
matches came about in this way. This finding is in line with the limited
amount of superlikes available to Tinder users (see footnote 8). Finally,
we note that male subjects started a conversation with the female
evaluated profiles much more often (42.3%) than the other way around
(6.2%). The explanation for this finding is similar to the explanation in
the previous paragraph for the higher selectiveness of women (com-
pared to men) with regard to (super)liking a certain profile.
Fig. 1 shows the fractions of matches (hereafter: ‘match probability’)
by the education level of the evaluated profiles. The leftmost bar chart
shows this for all subjects. Here we see that the match probability de-
creased as the education level of the evaluated profiles also decreased.
Similarly, in the centre and the rightmost bar charts, we can see that
this is broadly speaking also the case for both the male subjects and
female subjects, respectively. This is an indication that highly educated
people are more successful on mobile dating apps such as Tinder. In the
next section, we examine the statistical significance of these findings.
3.6. Ethical considerations
The creation of fictitious profiles on Facebook – which is a necessary
prerequisite to create profiles on Tinder – and on Tinder is against the
usage policies of both companies. However, creating fictitious profiles
was indispensable for our research design. This research design was
approved by the Ethical Committee of the Faculty of Economics and
Business Administration of Ghent University. To minimise incon-
venience to the subjects in our study, we did not interact with these
subjects once a match was obtained. This lack of interaction once a
Table 1
Summary statistics of the subjects for the full sample and by treatment status.
Variable Description (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
By treatment status
Full sample Ma+ Ma- Ba+ Ba-
mean (SD) mean (SD) mean (SD) mean (SD) mean (SD)
Number of profile pictures Continuous variable. 4.432 (1.411) 4.467 (1.390) 4.433 (1.416) 4.406 (1.412) 4.422 (1.426)
Age Continuous variable. 24.141 (1.180) 24.140 (1.195) 24.161 (1.218) 24.126 (1.154) 24.138 (1.152)
Education displayed 1 if displayed, 0 otherwise. 0.651 (-) 0.628 (-) 0.648 (-) 0.681 (-) 0.649 (-)
Education level 1 if high, 0 otherwise. 0.577 (-) 0.572 (-) 0.587 (-) 0.582 (-) 0.568 (-)
Occupation displayed 1 if displayed, 0 otherwise. 0.263 (-) 0.249 (-) 0.274 (-) 0.258 (-) 0.272 (-)
Occupation level 1 if high, 0 otherwise. 0.263 (-) 0.268 (-) 0.279 (-) 0.241 (-) 0.261 (-)
Bio displayed 1 if displayed, 0 otherwise. 0.571 (-) 0.560 (-) 0.577 (-) 0.587 (-) 0.562 (-)
Instagram account displayed 1 if displayed, 0 otherwise. 0.141 (-) 0.146 (-) 0.137 (-) 0.129 (-) 0.151 (-)
Spotify account displayed 1 if displayed, 0 otherwise. 0.113 (-) 0.125 (-) 0.109 (-) 0.111 (-) 0.106 (-)
N Number of observations. 3600 900 900 900 900
Notes. No standard deviations are presented for binary variables. The education levels (Ma+, Ma–, Ba+, and Ba–) are those of the evaluated profiles. See Section 3.3
for definitions of the variables Ma+, Ma–, Ba+, and Ba–.
Table 2
Summary statistics of the outcome variables for the full sample and by gender of the subjects.
(1) (2) (3)
All subjects (N=3600) Male subjects (N=1800) Female subjects (N=1800)
No match (proportion of all observations) 2403 (0.668) 684 (0.381) 1719 (0.955)
Match (proportion of all observations) 1197 (0.332) 1116 (0.619) 81 (0.045)
Like (proportion of number of matches) 1180 (0.986) 1100 (0.986) 80 (0.988)
Superlike (proportion of number of matches) 17 (0.014) 16 (0.014) 1 (0.012)
Conversation started (proportion of number of matches) 477 (0.398) 472 (0.423) 5 (0.062)
Note. Absolute numbers are reported with proportion of all observations or matches in parentheses.
16 Recall that a match is only formed when two users both like each other
(supra, Subsection 3.2).
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match was obtained is not unusual on Tinder. Indeed, 60.2% of subjects




In this subsection we present our bivariate analyses. As in Fig. 1, in
Table 3 we show for each education level of the evaluated profiles the
match probability in columns (1) and (2). Next, we verify in column (3)
whether the ratio of pairs of these match probabilities (hereafter:
‘match ratios’) significantly differs from 1, and therefore whether the
match probabilities significantly differ from each other. The match
probability of the evaluated profiles with the highest education level is
always in the numerator, so that a match ratio above (below) 1 means
there is a positive (negative) effect of a higher education level on the
number of matches obtained.
When considering all subjects in Panel A, we see that evaluated
profiles with a higher education level consistently score better com-
pared to their counterparts with a lower education level: all match
ratios are above 1. The match ratio is significantly different from 1
when comparing evaluated profiles with a Ma+ degree with those with
a Ba– degree. The former group is 15.3% more likely to receive a
Fig. 1. Match probability by treatment status and by gender of the subjects.
Table 3
Match ratios by treatment status.
(1) (2) (3)
Match probability education level (i) Match probability education level (ii) Match ratio: (1)/(2) [t-test]
A. All subjects
Ma+ (i) versus Ma– (ii) 0.360 0.331 1.087 [1.477]
Ma+ (i) versus Ba+ (ii) 0.360 0.327 1.102* [1.667]
Ma+ (i) versus Ba– (ii) 0.360 0.312 1.153** [2.355]
Ma– (i) versus Ba+ (ii) 0.331 0.327 1.014 [0.220]
Ma– (i) versus Ba– (ii) 0.331 0.312 1.060 [0.947]
Ba+ (i) versus Ba– (ii) 0.327 0.312 1.046 [0.718]
B. Male subjects
Ma+ (i) versus Ma– (ii) 0.640 0.622 1.029 [0.604]
Ma+ (i) versus Ba+ (ii) 0.640 0.624 1.025 [0.511]
Ma+ (i) versus Ba– (ii) 0.640 0.593 1.079 [1.499]
Ma– (i) versus Ba+ (ii) 0.622 0.624 0.996 [0.071]
Ma– (i) versus Ba– (ii) 0.622 0.593 1.049 [0.923]
Ba+ (i) versus Ba– (ii) 0.624 0.593 1.052 [0.987]
C. Female subjects
Ma+ (i) versus Ma– (ii) 0.080 0.040 2.000*** [2.650]
Ma+ (i) versus Ba+ (ii) 0.080 0.029 2.769*** [3.491]
Ma+ (i) versus Ba– (ii) 0.080 0.031 2.571*** [3.295]
Ma– (i) versus Ba+ (ii) 0.040 0.029 1.385 [0.982]
Ma– (i) versus Ba– (ii) 0.040 0.031 1.286 [0.770]
Ba+ (i) versus Ba– (ii) 0.029 0.031 0.929 [0.221]
Notes. The education levels (Ma+, Ma–, Ba+, and Ba–) are those of the evaluated profiles. See Section 3.3 for definitions of the variables Ma+, Ma–, Ba+, and Ba–.
The t-tests are corrected for clustering of the observations at the subject level. * (**) ((***)) indicates significance at the 10% (5%) ((1%)) level.
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(super)like compared to the latter group.
We show the results for male and female subjects separately in
Panels B and C, respectively. For the male subjects, the match ratios are
practically all (slightly) above 1, but they never significantly differ from
1. In contrast, for the female subjects the match ratios are substantially
higher and differ significantly from 1. More specifically, we find that
male evaluated profiles with a Ma+ degree secure at least twice as
many matches compared to their counterparts who were lower edu-
cated.
4.2. Multivariate analyses
In addition to our bivariate analyses in the previous subsection, we
also conduct multivariate analyses to control for the gender of the
subjects, the pictures and the names we used for the evaluated profiles,
and the cities in which we conducted our experiment. More specifically,
we run a logistic regression in which the dependent variable is assigned
a value of ‘0′ if there was no match (subjects disliked the evaluated
profile) and ‘1′ if there was a match (subjects (super)liked the evaluated
profile). Our independent variables of interest are dummy variables for
the different education levels of the evaluated profiles. Additionally, we
include the gender of the subject, dummy variables for the pictures and
the names used in the evaluated profiles, and dummy variables for the
cities in which we deployed the evaluated profiles as control variables.
The results from this regression analysis can be found in column (1) of
Table 4. Panel A shows the estimates for all subjects, while Panels B and
C show the estimates for the male and female subjects, respectively. As
a first robustness check, we replicate these analyses while combining
education levels of the evaluated profiles that are next to each other in
columns (2), (3), (4), and (5). Throughout all these analyses, we use the
lowest (combination of) education level(s) as a reference category for
the higher (combination of) education level(s).
Similar to the results of the bivariate analyses, we find that higher-
educated evaluated profiles are more successful on Tinder compared to
their lower-educated counterparts. This finding is present in each of our
five analyses shown in Table 4 and is driven by the highest education
level. Indeed, when considering all subjects, the evaluated profiles with
the highest education level have around one-third higher odds of ob-
taining a match compared to their lower-educated counterparts. When
considering the male and female subjects separately, we find that this
preference for profiles with the highest education level is driven by the
female subjects. Indeed, male subjects do not significantly favour fe-
male evaluated profiles with the highest education level (the odds ratios
never significantly differ from 1), whereas female subjects have around
two times higher odds of (super)liking male evaluated profiles if these
profiles had the highest education level.
As a first robustness check, we replicate all these regression analyses
with an ordered logistic regression in which our dependent variable is
assigned a value of ‘0′ if there was no match (subjects disliked the
evaluated profile), ‘1′ if there was a match (subjects (super)liked the
evaluated profile), and ‘2′ if the subjects started a conversation with the
evaluated profile. This does not substantially change our findings. See
Table 4
Match probability by treatment status: binary logistic regression results.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. All subjects
Ma+ 1.360** (0.174) 1.361** (0.174) / 1.323** (0.150) /
Ma+ or Ma– / / 1.282** (0.144) / 1.247** (0.117)
Ma– 1.202 (0.157) / / 1.169 (0.135) /
Ma– or Ba+ / 1.126 (0.123) / / /
Ba+ 1.059 (0.131) / 1.058 (0.131) / /
Ba+ or Ba– / / / Ref. Ref.
Ba– Ref. Ref. Ref. / /
Female subject 0.054*** (0.011) 0.054*** (0.011) 0.054*** (0.011) 0.054*** (0.011) 0.054*** (0.011)
Control for picture and name Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for city Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3600 3600 3600 3600 3600
B. Male subjects
Ma+ 1.153 (0.161) 1.153 (0.161) / 1.110 (0.134) /
Ma+ or Ma– / / 1.123 (0.136) / 1.082 (0.108)
Ma– 1.095 (0.153) / / 1.055 (0.129) /
Ma– or Ba+ / 1.087 (0.132) / / /
Ba+ 1.078 (0.153) / 1.078 (0.153) / /
Ba+ or Ba– / / / Ref. Ref.
Ba– Ref. Ref. Ref. / /
Control for picture and name Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for city Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800
C. Female subjects
Ma+ 1.986** (0.691) 1.953** (0.661) / 2.061** (0.628) /
Ma+ or Ma– / / 1.863* (0.619) / 1.914** (0.517)
Ma– 1.626 (0.667) / / 1.698 (0.580) /
Ma– or Ba+ / 1.216 (0.420) / / /
Ba+ 0.927 (0.385) / 0.949 (0.401) / /
Ba+ or Ba– / / / Ref. Ref.
Ba– Ref. Ref. Ref. / /
Control for picture and name Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for city Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800
Notes. The dependent variable is '0′ when there is no match and '1′ when there is a match. See Section 3.3 for definitions of the variables Ma+, Ma–, Ba+, and Ba–.
Coefficients are odds ratios. Standard errors are corrected for clustering of the observations at the subject level and are reported between parentheses. * (**) ((***))
indicates significance at the 10% (5%) ((1%)) level.
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Table A–4 in the Appendix for the regression results. Additionally, as
some subjects were recruited into the experiment by multiple fictitious
profiles (supra, Section 3.4), in a second robustness check we replicated
our multivariate analyses correcting for random effects on the subject
level. This too does not substantially change our findings.
On the one hand, the finding in both our bivariate and multivariate
analyses that education level – potentially signalling earnings potential
(supra, Section 3.3) – matters significantly only for female subjects, is in
line with previous research on mate preferences (supra, Section 2.2).
More specifically, it is in line with previous studies examining stated
mate preferences (Buss, 1989; Buss & Barnes, 1986; Buss et al., 1990;
Shackelford et al., 2005; Whyte et al., 2018; Wiederman & Allgeier,
1992) and previous studies examining actual mate preferences in speed-
dating events (Fisman et al., 2006) and on classic online dating websites
(Hitsch et al., 2010a, 2010b; Ong, 2016). Apparently, women's pre-
ference for highly educated – and therefore indirectly potentially high-
earning partners – is still present on the recently popular mobile dating
apps such as Tinder. Additionally, these findings are in line with the
previously identified higher selectivity of women (compared to men)
when evaluating potential partners, which we discussed in Section 3.5.
On the other hand, the finding that men on Tinder do not seem to be
intimidated by highly educated – and therefore potentially high-earning
– women is in contrast with multiple studies that did find evidence for
men's aversion to highly educated women (supra, Section 2.1). More
specifically, this is in contrast with Bertrand et al. (2015) and
Hwang (2016), who found that marriages where the wife earns more
than the husband are less common, as well as in contrast with both
Hitsch et al. (2010a) and Fisman et al. (2006), who found that men
disfavour highly educated and highly ambitious women, respectively. It
is also in contrast with the study by Hitsch et al. (2010b), although this
study found that men have a preference for a high-income partner
compared to a low-income partner.
We suggest three possible explanations for this contrasting finding
for male subjects. First, as our results are in line with those of
Ong (2016), who also obtained his results by setting up a field ex-
periment, we argue that this research design, i.e. random assignment of
education level, is crucial for identifying unbiased mate preferences.
Indeed, such a research design is able to estimate the effect of education
level on mate preferences separate from the effect of (unobservable)
factors correlated with education level (supra, Section 2.3). Second,
Sumter et al. (2017) found that men more often than women state ca-
sual sex as a motivation for using Tinder and that men also have more
one night stands through Tinder compared to women. Men's higher
focus on casual relationships may be another driver of our result. Still,
the fact that men are not intimidated by highly educated women even
for short, casual relationships is remarkable and inconsistent with
earlier studies that did suggest this aversion (Fisman et al., 2006; Pierce
et al., 2013). Third, our study focuses on relatively young people (aged
between 23 and 27, supra SubSection 3.4), who have to a great extent
been raised by working mothers. Multiple studies have shown that
women's increasing presence on the labour market is weakening tra-
ditional gender identity roles: Fernández Fogli and Olivetti (2004) have
shown this change in attitudes for men and Olivetti, Patacchini and
Zenou (2018) have shown this change in attitudes for women. This
weakening of gender identity roles causes the cost for men from de-
viating from these gender identity roles – i.e. when mating with a
highly educated or high-earning partner – to decrease, in turn causing
them to be less intimidated by highly educated women.
4.3. Homogamy, hypergamy, and hypogamy
In this subsection we examine whether the findings in the previous
subsection are (in part) driven by a preference for a partner with a
similar education level, i.e. a preference for educational assortative
mating (also ‘homogamy based on education level’). For 2345 subjects
(65.1%), we have information on whether or not they attended
university.17 A total of 1354 of these subjects (57.7%) attended uni-
versity while the other 991 subjects (42.3%) did not. Also for the
evaluated profiles we know – by design – that some attended university
(those with education levels ‘Ma+’ and ‘Ma–‘), while others did not
(those with education levels ‘Ba+’ and ‘Ba–‘) (supra, Section 3.3) – they
attended the less-prestigious colleges.18 Based on this information, we
create three new variables. The variable homogamy is ‘1′ if the eval-
uated profile and the subject have the same education level, i.e. they
both did or both did not attend university, ‘0′ otherwise. The variable
hypergamy is ‘1′ if the evaluated profile has a higher education level
than the subject, i.e. the evaluated profile attended university, but the
subject did not, ‘0′ otherwise. The variable hypogamy is ‘1′ if the eval-
uated profile has a lower education level than the subject, i.e. the
evaluated profile did not attend university, but the subject did, ‘0′
otherwise. In our sample, there was a situation of homogamy, hy-
pergamy, or hypogamy in 1173, 483, and 689 cases, respectively.
Similar to our bivariate analyses in Section 4.1, in Table 5 we show
for each situation (homogamy and no homogamy, hypergamy and no
hypergamy, and hypogamy and no hypogamy) the match probability in
columns (1) and (2). Next, we show in column (3) whether the ratio of
pairs of these match probabilities (again denoted as ‘match ratios’)
significantly differs from 1, and therefore whether the match prob-
abilities significantly differ from each other.
We do not find any evidence for a specific preference for homogamy
based on education level. Indeed, when we compare the situation of
homogamy with the situation of no homogamy, the match ratios never
significantly differ from 1, neither in the full sample nor in the sub-
samples of male and female subjects. These findings are not in line with
most studies examining mating preferences in an offline setting and on
classic online dating websites that found evidence for educational as-
sortative mating (supra, Section 2.2).
We suggest that the lack of evidence for educational assortative
mating on mobile dating apps such as Tinder is due to three reasons.
First, compared to most previous studies in an offline setting and on
classic online dating websites, our experimental design allows us to
examine actual mate preferences instead of stated mate preferences,
which have been shown to differ substantially (supra, Section 2.2).
Second, as already mentioned in Section 2.3, search frictions, which
may have driven educational assortative mating in previous research on
offline dating and classic online dating websites, are non-existent on
Tinder. Ortega and Hergovich (2017) already suggested that Tinder's
ability to eliminate search frictions has decreased racial homogamy,
illustrated by the jump in interracial marriages following the launch of
Tinder in 2012. Third, as introduced in Section 2.3, social frictions
influence mating behaviour less (or even not at all) on Tinder compared
to offline dating or classic online dating websites, as the anonymity
within which Tinder users express interest in another user reduces (or
even eliminates) the psychological cost of being rejected.
While we find no evidence for a specific preference for homogamy,
we do find that Tinder users favour (disfavour) a situation of homo-
gamy compared to a situation of hypogamy (hypergamy). Indeed, in the
full sample the match ratio is significantly above (below) 1 when
comparing the situation of homogamy with the situation of hypogamy
(hypergamy). Although the results seem to be driven by the female
subsample, the match ratios are, however, insignificant for both the
male and female subsamples.
17 We cannot rule out that the results in this subsection are driven by a se-
lection bias introduced by only considering subjects who reported their own
education level. However, as the results from the previous paragraphs are un-
changed when considering only these subjects (see Table A–5 in the Appendix
for a replication of Table 3 for these subjects), we are confident that the results
in this subsection are not driven by a selection bias.
18 As the education level of the subjects consisted of two levels, i.e. attended
university or not, we limited the four education levels of the evaluated profiles
also to two levels, again attended university or not.
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The preference for hypergamy is confirmed when comparing the
situation of hypergamy directly to the situation of no hypergamy.
Indeed, when considering all subjects, they are 26.5% more likely to
(super)like an evaluated profile that is higher educated than them-
selves, compared to when that is not the case. This effect is driven by
the female subjects, who (super)like higher educated profiles 92.2%
more often, while this effect is not significant for the male subjects.
These findings are in line with those of Whyte and Torgler (2017a), who
found, using data from a classic online dating website, that women are
more likely than men to contact a potential partner with a higher
education level.
Additionally, the aversion to hypogamy is confirmed when com-
paring the situation of hypogamy to the situation of no hypogamy.
When considering all subjects, they are 18.3% less likely to (super)like
an evaluated profile that is lower educated than themselves, compared
to when that is not the case. This effect is present for both male and
female subjects. More specifically, compared to a situation of no hy-
pogamy, male and female subjects (super)like lower-educated eval-
uated profiles 10.1% and 45.4% less often, respectively – although for
the female subjects this result is only significant at the 10% confidence
level. The finding that this match ratio is substantially lower for the
female subjects compared to the male subjects, confirms the findings of
both Skopek et al. (2010) and Whyte and Torgler (2017a), who found
that women are more reluctant than men to contact lower-educated
potential partners.
Finally, when directly comparing a situation of hypergamy to a si-
tuation of hypogamy we find – naturally – that in this scenario there
exists a strong preference for hypergamy. Taking into account the dis-
cussion in the previous paragraph, in the female subsample this result is
driven by both a preference for hypergamy and an aversion to hypo-
gamy, while in the male subsample this result is driven solely by an
aversion to hypogamy.
Combining these findings with our findings from the previous sub-
section, we can conclude that for women on Tinder the preference for a
highly educated partner is not only absolute but also relative to their
own education level. Contrarily, men on Tinder do not have a
preference for a potential partner with a higher education level than
themselves. However, the fact that they also do not have an aversion to
this situation again confirms that they are not intimidated by highly
educated women, even if a woman's education level would exceed their
own. Moreover, they even disfavour women who have a lower educa-
tion level than themselves. Three possible explanations for these find-
ings for men are similar to those raised in Section 4.2 when discussing
the absence of men's aversion to highly educated women.
5. Conclusion
In this study, we examined by means of a field experiment the im-
pact of an individual's education level on her/his success on mobile
dating apps such as Tinder, thereby contributing to both the literature
on the (non-monetary) returns to education and the literature on
mating behaviour. Our unique experimental design allowed us to ex-
amine the causal effect of education on actual, revealed (instead of
stated) mate preferences in a dating market without substantial search
frictions and social frictions. Based on a sample of 3600 Tinder profile
evaluations, we found that education level matters only substantially
when female Tinder users evaluate male Tinder profiles, and not vice
versa. This finding is in line with previous literature from multiple
fields that found that women have a higher preference for a highly
educated partner who in turn has a higher earnings potential.
Additionally, in contrast to earlier studies from the field of economics
we found no evidence that men are intimidated by highly educated –
and therefore potentially high-earning – women. This may have im-
portant, positive consequences for women on the labour market, who
have been shown in the past to shy away from behaviour that may
improve their careers in order to avoid signalling undesirable traits on
the dating market, such as ambition.
Additionally, we examined whether these mate preferences were
driven by a preference to find a partner with a similar education level,
also denoted as educational assortative mating. We found that this was
not the case on Tinder, in contrast to most studies examining this
sorting behaviour in an offline setting and on classic online dating
Table 5
Match ratios by homogamy, hypergamy, and hypogamy.
(1) (2) (3)
Match probability situation (i) Match probability situation (ii) Match ratio: (1)/(2) [t-test]
A. All subjects
Homogamy (i) versus no homogamy (ii) 0.321 0.322 0.996 [0.064]
Homogamy (i) versus hypergamy (ii) 0.321 0.385 0.833** [2.485]
Homogamy (i) versus hypogamy (ii) 0.321 0.277 1.156** [2.067]
Hypergamy (i) versus no hypergamy (ii) 0.385 0.305 1.265*** [3.113]
Hypogamy (i) versus no hypogamy (ii) 0.277 0.339 0.817*** [2.953]
Hypergamy (i) versus hypogamy (ii) 0.385 0.277 1.389*** [3.528]
B. Male subjects
Homogamy (i) versus no homogamy (ii) 0.638 0.623 1.024 [0.539]
Homogamy (i) versus hypergamy (ii) 0.638 0.672 0.950 [0.916]
Homogamy (i) versus hypogamy (ii) 0.638 0.583 1.094 [1.622]
Hypergamy (i) versus no hypergamy (ii) 0.672 0.618 1.086 [1.508]
Hypogamy (i) versus no hypogamy (ii) 0.583 0.649 0.899** [2.001]
Hypergamy (i) versus hypogamy (ii) 0.672 0.583 1.152** [2.068]
C. Female subjects
Homogamy (i) versus no homogamy (ii) 0.037 0.038 0.974 [0.095]
Homogamy (i) versus hypergamy (ii) 0.037 0.062 0.601 [1.422]
Homogamy (i) versus hypogamy (ii) 0.037 0.024 1.554 [1.124]
Hypergamy (i) versus no hypergamy (ii) 0.062 0.032 1.922* [1.750]
Hypogamy (i) versus no hypogamy (ii) 0.024 0.044 0.546* [1.821]
Hypergamy (i) versus hypogamy (ii) 0.062 0.024 2.583** [2.058]
Notes. See Section 4.3 for definitions of the variables homogamy, hypergamy, and hypogamy. The t-tests are corrected for clustering of the observations at the subject
level. * (**) ((***)) indicates significance at the 10% (5%) ((1%)) level.
B. Neyt, et al. Economics of Education Review 73 (2019) 101914
10
websites. We argue that the lack of evidence for educational assortative
mating on Tinder was due to our experimental design, which allowed us
to (i) examine actual (instead of stated) mate preferences, (ii) eliminate
search frictions, and (iii) eliminate social frictions. As previous studies
have shown that educational assortative mating enforces income in-
equality (Blossfeld & Buchholz, 2009; Greenwood et al., 2014; Hu &
Qian, 2015; Mare, 1991), the decrease in assortative mating due to the
recently popular mobile dating apps such as Tinder may have important
implications for the income distribution across households in today's
society.
We end this study by summing up several limitations of our research
design. First, the main limitation of this study is that using education
levels from one field of study limits the generalisability of our results.
For both practical and ethical reasons, we were only able and allowed
to create a certain number of fictitious profiles and perform a certain
number of swipes with each of these profiles, which limited the amount
of variation we could introduce in our experiment. In order to maximise
internal validity, we did not vary the field of study of our profiles’
education level, so that this could not be the driver of our results in-
stead of our independent variable of interest, i.e. our profiles’ education
level. Our choice for the field of study ‘economics and business’ was
driven by the fact that this is the second largest field of study in the
region in which we gathered our data, after the field of study ‘health
sciences’, which we did not use because it is to a great extent only
populated by female students (74,21%). Therefore, a logical way for
future research to build on this study would be to verify whether the
mating behaviour identified here is also present when examining other
fields of study.
Second, we only looked at the first stage of a relationship, i.e.
showing interest in another person on a mobile dating app. Therefore,
our results cannot be generalised to mating behaviour in later stages of
a relationship. Nonetheless, we believe the findings with regard to this
first stage are interesting, as it is a necessary stage that each individual
using mobile dating apps needs to get through in order to advance to
the later stages of a relationship. It is in this sense comparable to pre-
vious studies conducting field experiments on the labour market that
looked at whether an applicant receives an invitation to a job interview.
Here too, the job interview is a necessary first stage applicants need to
get through in order to advance to further stages of the job application
process and to potentially secure the job. Still, future research can
complement this study by examining whether mate preferences in the
later stages of relationships that started on mobile dating apps are
comparable to the mate preferences in the initial phase of the re-
lationship identified here.
Third, our experimental design did not allow us to disentangle
which mechanisms drove our results. More specifically, although we
established that women favoured potential partners who were highly
educated, we were unable to deduce why this was the case. More spe-
cifically, we do not know if this effect was driven by a preference for (i)
an intelligent partner, (ii) a partner with high status, (iii) a partner with
a high earnings potential, or (iv) something else. Future research could
complement this study by identifying the main driver(s) of this pre-
ference of women for a highly educated potential partner.
Similarly, we argue that the lack of evidence for preferences for
educational assortative mating on mobile dating apps such as Tinder
was due to our research design, which allowed us to (i) investigate
actual (instead of stated) mate preferences, (ii) eliminate search fric-
tions, and (iii) eliminate social frictions. However, here too we were
unable to disentangle which one of these three elements (or potentially
another) was the main driver of this lack of evidence for educational
assortative mating. Future research could contribute to the literature on
assortative mating by examining the importance of each of these three
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Student enrolment in each subfield of the education levels of the fictitious profiles in the academic year 2017–2018.
Source: Agentschap voor Hoger Onderwijs, Volwassenenonderwijs, Kwalificaties en Studietoelagen.
Total Males Females
Master in Business Engineering (Ma+) 3739 2445 (65.39%) 1294 (34.61%)
Master in Public Administration and Management (Ma–) 506 226 (44.66%) 280 (55.34%)
Bachelor in Business Management (Ba+) 18,775 10,917 (58.15%) 7858 (41.85%)
Bachelor in Office Management (Ba–) 4140 1215 (29.35%) 2925 (70.65%)
Total 27,160 14,803 (54.50%) 12,357 (45.50%)
Fig. A-1. Example profile.
Note. As mentioned in Section 3.2, occupation and education are optional entries for one's Tinder profile.




Representation of the randomisation process.
Note. The different shades of grey indicate different ‘looks’, i.e. different pictures.





P-values for the coefficients measuring the difference between subjects by treatment status.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Ma+ vs. Ma– Ma+ vs. Ba+ Ma+ vs. Ba– Ma– vs. Ba+ Ma– vs. Ba– Ba+ vs. Ba–
Number of profile pictures 0.710 0.810 0.977 0.541 0.689 0.832
Age 0.604 0.363 0.494 0.695 0.869 0.820
Education displayed 0.377 0.017** 0.351 0.134 0.961 0.148
Education level 0.608 0.710 0.913 0.882 0.531 0.627
Occupation displayed 0.218 0.665 0.260 0.424 0.916 0.488
Occupation level 0.780 0.517 0.871 0.345 0.651 0.618
Bio displayed 0.575 0.296 0.755 0.627 0.383 0.175
Instagram account displayed 0.296 0.371 0.203 0.880 0.819 0.705
Spotify account displayed 0.475 0.253 0.924 0.667 0.536 0.294
Notes. The education levels (Ma+, Ma–, Ba+, and Ba–) are those of the evaluated profiles. See Section 3.3 for definitions of the variables Ma+, Ma–, Ba+, and Ba–.
* (**) ((***)) indicates significance at the 10% (5%) ((1%)) level.
Table A-4
Match/conversation probability by treatment status: ordered logistic regression results.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. All subjects
Ma+ 1.385*** (0.160) 1.385*** (0.160) / 1.293** (0.130) /
Ma+ or Ma– / / 1.288** (0.131) / 1.201** (0.101)
Ma– 1.190 (0.142) / / 1.109 (0.116) /
Ma– or Ba+ / 1.170 (0.119) / / /
Ba+ 1.151 (0.134) / 1.152 (0.135) / /
Ba+ or Ba– / / / Ref. Ref.
Ba– Ref. Ref. Ref. / /
Female subject 0.052*** (0.010) 0.052*** (0.010) 0.052*** (0.010) 0.052*** (0.010) 0.052*** (0.010)
Control for picture and name Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for city Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3600 3600 3600 3600 3600
B. Male subjects
Ma+ 1.220 (0.149) 1.219 (0.149) / 1.124 (0.118) /
Ma+ or Ma– / / 1.161 (0.124) / 1.069 (0.093)
Ma– 1.105 (0.137) / / 1.017 (0.110) /
Ma– or Ba+ / 1.142 (0.124) / / /
Ba+ 1.182 (0.151) / 1.183 (0.151) / /
Ba+ or Ba– / / / Ref. Ref.
Ba– Ref. Ref. Ref. / /
Control for picture and name Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for city Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800
C. Female subjects
Ma+ 1.976** (0.687) 1.944** (0.658) / 2.052** (0.625) /
Ma+ or Ma– / / 1.856* (0.617) / 1.909** (0.516)
Ma– 1.623 (0.667) / / 1.697 (0.580) /
Ma– or Ba+ / 1.214 (0.420) / / /
Ba+ 0.925 (0.385) / 0.947 (0.400) / /
Ba+ or Ba– / / / Ref. Ref.
Ba– Ref. Ref. Ref. / /
Control for picture and name Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for city Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800
Notes. The dependent variable is ‘0′ when there is no match, ‘1′ when there is a match, and ‘2′ if the subject started a conversation with the evaluated profile. See
Section 3.3 for definitions of the variables Ma+, Ma–, Ba+, and Ba–. Coefficients are odds ratios. Standard errors are corrected for clustering of the observations at
the subject level and are reported between parentheses. * (**) ((***)) indicates significance at the 10% (5%) ((1%)) level.




About Tinder (2019). Retrieved fromhttps://www.gotinder.com/press[accessed on 21
May 2019].
Akerlof, G. A., & Kranton, R. E. (2000). Economics and identity. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 115(3), 715–753.
Baert, S. (2018). Hiring discrimination: An overview of (almost) all correspondence ex-
periments since 2005. In S. M. Gaddis (Vol. Ed.), Audit Studies: Behind the scenes with
Theory, Method, and nuance: 14, (pp. 63–77). Cham: Springer.
Baert, S., Cockx, B., Gheyle, N., & Vandamme, C. (2015). Is there less discrimination in
occupations where recruitment is difficult. ILR Review, 68(3), 467–500.
Belot, M., & Francesconi, M. (2013). Dating preferences and meeting opportunities in
mate choice decisions. Journal of Human Resources, 48(2), 474–508.
Bertrand, M., Kamenica, E., & Pan, J. (2015). Gender identity and relative income within
households. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130(2), 571–614.
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2004). Are Emily and Greg more employable than
Lakisha and Jamal? A field experiment on labor market discrimination. American
Economic Review, 94(4), 991–1013.
Blossfeld, H. P. (2009). Educational assortative marriage in comparative perspective.
Annual Review of Sociology, 35, 513–530.
Blossfeld, H. P., & Buchholz, S. (2009). Increasing resource inequality among families in
modern societies: The mechanisms of growing educational homogamy, changes in the
division of work in the family and the decline of the male breadwinner model. Journal
of Comparative Family Studies, 40(4), 603–616.
Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2011). Amazon's mechanical Turk: A new
source of inexpensive, yet high-quality, data? Perspectives on Psychological Science,
6(1), 3–5.
Buonanno, P., & Leonida, L. (2009). Non-market effects of education on crime: Evidence
from Italian regions. Economics of Education Review, 28(1), 11–17.
Bursztyn, L., Fujiwara, T., & Pallais, A. (2017). 'Acting wife': Marriage market incentives
and labor market investments. American Economic Review, 107(11), 3288–3319.
Buss, D. M. (1985). Human mate selection: Opposites are sometimes said to attract, but in
fact we are likely to marry someone who is similar to us in almost every variable.
American Scientist, 73(1), 47–51.
Buss, D. M. (1989). Sex differences in human mate preferences: Evolutionary hypotheses
tested in 37 cultures. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 12(1), 1–14.
Buss, D. M., Abbott, M., Angleitner, A., Asherian, A., Biaggio, A., Blanco-Villasenor, A.,
et al. (1990). International preferences in selecting mates: A study of 37 cultures.
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 21(1), 5–47.
Buss, D. M., & Barnes, M. (1986). Preferences in human mate selection. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 50(3), 559–570.
Cacioppo, J. T., Cacioppo, S., Gonzaga, G. C., Ogburn, E. L., & VanderWeele, T. J. (2013).
Marital satisfaction and break-ups differ across on-line and off-line meeting venues.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 110(25), 10135–10140.
Card, D., & Krueger, A. B. (1992). Does school quality matter? Returns to education and
the characteristics of public schools in the united states. Journal of Political Economy,
100(1), 1–40.
Chen, W. C. (2012). How education enhances happiness: Comparison of mediating factors
in four east asian countries. Social Indicators Research, 106(1), 117–131.
Cuñado, J., & de Gracia, F. P. (2012). Does education affect happiness? Evidence for
spain. Social Indicators Research, 108(1), 185–196.
De populairste Vlaamse jongensnamen van 1995 (n.d.). Retrieved fromhttps://www.
vernoeming.nl/populair/jongensnamen-vlaanderen-1995[accessed on 22 December
2017].
De populairste Vlaamse meisjesnamen van 1995 (n.d.). Retrieved fromhttps://www.
vernoeming.nl/populair/meisjesnamen-vlaanderen-1995[accessed on 22 December
2017].
Domingue, B. W., Fletcher, J., Conley, D., & Boardman, J. D. (2014). Genetic and edu-
cational assortative mating among US adults. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, 111(22), 7996–8000.
Eastwick, P. W., & Finkel, E. J. (2008). Sex differences in mate preferences revisited: Do
people know what they initially desire in a romantic partner? Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 94(2), 245–264.
Eriksson, S., & Rooth, D. O. (2014). Do employers use unemployment as a sorting cri-
terion when hiring? Evidence from a field experiment. American Economic Review,
104(3), 1014–1039.
Fernández, R., Fogli, A., & Olivetti, C. (2004). Mothers and sons: Preference formation
and female labor force dynamics. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(4), 1249–1299.
Finkel, E. J., Eastwick, P. W., Karney, B. R., Reis, H. T., & Sprecher, S. (2012). Online
dating: A critical analysis from the perspective of psychological science. Psychological
Science in the Public Interest, 13(1), 3–66.
Fiore, A. T., Taylor, L. S., Zhong, X., Mendelsohn, G. A., & Cheshire, C. (2010, January).
Who's right and who writes: People, profiles, contacts, and replies in online dating.
System Sciences (HICSS), 2010 43rd Hawaii International Conference (pp. 1–10). IEEE.
Fisman, R., Iyengar, S. S., Kamenica, E., & Simonson, I. (2006). Gender differences in
mate selection: Evidence from a speed dating experiment. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 121(2), 673–697.
Fortin, N. M. (2005). Gender role attitudes and the labour-market outcomes of women
across OECD countries. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 21(3), 416–438.
Fruhlinger, J. (2018,. August 2). It's over: Tinder won the dating wars. Swipe or stay home.
Retrieved fromhttps://www.digitaltrends.com/social-media/tinder-most-popular-
dating-app[accessed on 25 October 2018].
Goodman, J. K., Cryder, C. E., & Cheema, A. (2013). Data collection in a flat world: The
strengths and weaknesses of mechanical turk samples. Journal of Behavioral Decision
Making, 26(3), 213–224.
Greenwood, J., Guner, N., Kocharkov, G., & Santos, C. (2014). Marry your like:
Assortative mating and income inequality. American Economic Review, 104(5),
348–353.
Groot, W., & Van Den Brink, H. M. (2007). The health effects of education. Economics of
Education Review, 26(2), 186–200.
Groot, W., & van den Brink, H. M. (2010). The effects of education on crime. Applied
Economics, 42(3), 279–289.
Hitsch, G. J., Hortaçsu, A., & Ariely, D. (2010a). Matching and sorting in online dating.
Table A-5
Match ratios by treatment status, using the sample of subjects who reported their own education level.
(1) (2) (3)
Match probability education level (i) Match probability education level (ii) Match ratio: (1)/(2) [t-test]
A. All subjects
Ma+ (i) versus Ma– (ii) 0.347 0.319 1.088 [1.003]
Ma+ (i) versus Ba+ (ii) 0.347 0.321 1.081 [0.862]
Ma+ (i) versus Ba– (ii) 0.347 0.298 1.164* [3.153]
Ma– (i) versus Ba+ (ii) 0.319 0.321 0.994 [0.008]
Ma– (i) versus Ba– (ii) 0.319 0.298 1.070 [0.609]
Ba+ (i) versus Ba– (ii) 0.321 0.298 1.077 [0.767]
B. Male subjects
Ma+ (i) versus Ma– (ii) 0.652 0.631 1.033 [0.253]
Ma+ (i) versus Ba+ (ii) 0.652 0.640 1.019 [0.094]
Ma+ (i) versus Ba– (ii) 0.652 0.599 1.088 [1.632]
Ma– (i) versus Ba+ (ii) 0.631 0.640 0.986 [0.043]
Ma– (i) versus Ba– (ii) 0.631 0.599 1.053 [0.600]
Ba+ (i) versus Ba– (ii) 0.640 0.599 1.068 [0.996]
C. Female subjects
Ma+ (i) versus Ma– (ii) 0.062 0.042 1.476 [1.176]
Ma+ (i) versus Ba+ (ii) 0.062 0.022 2.818** [6.003]
Ma+ (i) versus Ba– (ii) 0.062 0.026 2.385** [4.564]
Ma– (i) versus Ba+ (ii) 0.042 0.022 1.909 [2.001]
Ma– (i) versus Ba– (ii) 0.042 0.026 1.615 [1.199]
Ba+ (i) versus Ba– (ii) 0.022 0.026 0.846 [0.101]
Notes. The education levels (Ma+, Ma–, Ba+, and Ba–) are those of the evaluated profiles. See Section 3.3 for definitions of the variables Ma+, Ma–, Ba+, and Ba–.
The t-tests are corrected for clustering of the observations at the subject level. * (**) ((***)) indicates significance at the 10% (5%) ((1%)) level.
B. Neyt, et al. Economics of Education Review 73 (2019) 101914
15
American Economic Review, 100(1), 130–163.
Hitsch, G. J., Hortaçsu, A., & Ariely, D. (2010b). What makes you click? – Mate pre-
ferences in online dating. Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 8(4), 393–427.
Hout, M. (2012). Social and economic returns to college education in the United States.
Annual Review of Sociology, 38, 379–400.
Hu, A., & Qian, Z. (2015). Educational homogamy and earnings inequality of married
couples: Urban China, 1988–2007. Research in Social Stratification and Mobility, 40,
1–15.
Hwang, J. (2016). Housewife, “gold miss,” and equal: The evolution of educated women's
role in Asia and the US. Journal of Population Economics, 29(2), 529–570.
Jensen, R. (2010). The (perceived) returns to education and the demand for schooling.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(2), 515–548.
Katz, S. (1995). The importance of being beautiful. Down to Earth Sociology, 8, 301–307.
Kroft, K., Lange, F., & Notowidigdo, M. J. (2013). Duration dependence and labor market
conditions: Evidence from a field experiment. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128(3),
1123–1167.
Kuchler, H. (2018,. August 14). Tinder founders say parent company cheated them.
Retrieved fromhttps://www.ft.com/content/9f7914cc-9fe5-11e8-85da-
eeb7a9ce36e4[accessed on 25 Oct 2018].
LeFebvre, L. E. (2017). Swiping me off my feet: Explicating relationship initiation on
Tinder. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 35(9), 1–25.
Leigh, A., & Ryan, C. (2008). Estimating returns to education using different natural
experiment techniques. Economics of Education Review, 27(2), 149–160.
Machin, S., Marie, O., & Vujić, S. (2011). The crime reducing effect of education.
Economic Journal, 121(552), 463–484.
Mare, R. D. (1991). Five decades of educational assortative mating. American Sociological
Review, 56(1), 15–32.
Olivetti, C., Patacchini, E., & Zenou, Y. (2018). Mothers, peers, and gender-role identity.
Journal of the European Economic Association. Https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvy050.
Ong, D., & Wang, J. (2015). Income attraction: An online dating field experiment. Journal
of Economic Behavior & Organization, 111, 13–22.
Ong, D. (2016). Education and income attraction: An online dating field experiment.
Applied Economics, 48(19), 1816–1830.
Ortega, J., & Hergovich, P. (2017). The strength of absent ties: Social integration via
online dating. Mimeo.
Paolacci, G., Chandler, J., & Ipeirotis, P. G. (2010). Running experiments on amazon
mechanical turk. Judgment and Decision Making, 5(5), 411–419.
Pencavel, J. (1998). Assortative mating by schooling and the work behavior of wives and
husbands. American Economic Review, 88(2), 326–329.
Pierce, L., Dahl, M. S., & Nielsen, J. (2013). In sickness and in wealth: Psychological and
sexual costs of income comparison in marriage. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 39(3), 359–374.
Psacharopoulos, G., & Patrinos, H. A. (2004). Returns to investment in education: A
further update. Education Economics, 12(2), 111–134.
Rand, D. G. (2012). The promise of mechanical Turk: How online labor markets can help
theorists run behavioral experiments. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 299, 172–179.
Ranzini, G., & Lutz, C. (2017). Love at first swipe? Explaining Tinder self-presentation and
motives. Mobile Media and Communication, 5(1), 80–101.
Rockwell, R. C. (1976). Historical trends and variations in educational homogamy.
Journal of Marriage and the Family, 38(1), 83–95.
Rosenfeld, M. J., & Thomas, R. J. (2012). Searching for a mate: The rise of the internet as
a social intermediary. American Sociological Review, 77(4), 523–547.
Shackelford, T. K., Schmitt, D. P., & Buss, D. M. (2005). Universal dimensions of human
mate preferences. Personality and Individual Differences, 39(2), 447–458.
Shafer, K., & Qian, Z. (2010). Marriage timing and educational assortative mating. Journal
of Comparative Family Studies, 41(5), 661–691.
Silles, M. A. (2009). The causal effect of education on health: Evidence from the United
Kingdom. Economics of Education review, 28(1), 122–128.
Silventoinen, K., Kaprio, J., Lahelma, E., Viken, R. J., & Rose, R. J. (2003). Assortative
mating by body height and BMI: Finnish twins and their spouses. American Journal of
Human Biology, 15(5), 620–627.
Skopek, J., Schulz, F., & Blossfeld, H. P. (2010). Who contacts whom? Educational
homophily in online mate selection. European Sociological Review, 27(2), 180–195.
Spuhler, J. N. (1968). Assortative mating with respect to physical characteristics. Eugenics
Quarterly, 15(2), 128–140.
Sumter, S. R., Vandenbosch, L., & Ligtenberg, L. (2017). Love me Tinder: Untangling
emerging adults’ motivations for using the dating application Tinder. Telematics and
Informatics, 34(1), 67–78.
Timmermans, E., & Courtois, C. (2018). From swiping to casual sex and/or committed
relationships: Exploring the experiences of Tinder users. Information Society, 34(2),
59–70.
Timmermans, E., & De Caluwé, E. (2017). Development and validation of the Tinder
motives scale (TMS). Computers in Human Behavior, 70(1), 341–350.
Todd, P. M., Penke, L., Fasolo, B., & Lenton, A. P. (2007). Different cognitive processes
underlie human mate choices and mate preferences. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, 104(38), 15011–15016.
Trivers, R. L. (1972). Parental investment and sexual selection. In B. Campbell (Ed.).
Sexual selection and the descent of man 1871–1971 (pp. 136–179). Chicago: Aldine.
Tyson, G., Perta, V. C., Haddadi, H., & Seto, M. C. (2016). A first look at user activity on
Tinder. Advances in Social Networks Analysis and Mining (ASONAM), IEEE/ACM
International Conference (pp. 461–466). IEEE.
Vila, L. E. (2000). The non‐monetary benefits of education. European Journal of Education,
35(1), 21–32.
Ward, J. (2016). Swiping, matching, chatting: Self-presentation and self-disclosure on
mobile dating apps. Human IT: Journal for Information Technology Studies as a Human
Science, 13(2), 81–95.
Watson, D., Klohnen, E. C., Casillas, A., Nus Simms, E., Haig, J., & Berry, D. S. (2004).
Match makers and deal breakers: Analyses of assortative mating in newlywed cou-
ples. Journal of Personality, 72(5), 1029–1068.
Wiederman, M. W., & Allgeier, E. R. (1992). Gender differences in mate selection criteria:
sociobiological or socioeconomic explanation. Ethology & Sociobiology, 13(2),
115–124.
Whyte, S., Chan, H. F., & Torgler, B. (2018). Do men and women know what they want?
Sex differences in online daters’ educational preferences. Psychological Science, 29(8),
1370–1375.
Whyte, S., & Torgler, B. (2017a). Things change with age: educational assortment in
online dating. Personality and Individual Differences, 109, 5–11.
Whyte, S., & Torgler, B. (2017b). Preference versus choice in online dating.
Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking, 20(3), 150–156.
B. Neyt, et al. Economics of Education Review 73 (2019) 101914
16
